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Switching Juries in Midstream*: The Perplexities of
Penalty-Phase-Only Retrials
David McCord**
This article addresses the oft-recurring, but seldom analyzed scenario where
a capital conviction is affirmed, but the sentence is reversed, and the prosecutor
elects to retry the penalty phase before a new jury. There are not many doctrinal
issues raised in these circumstances, but there are a host of practical ones,
including: how the jury is to be apprised of the facts underlying the conviction;
whether the defense can challenge the underlying facts; how the long delay affects
the prospects for each party; how the defendant's behavior in the interim may
affect the verdict; and many more. Since these are not mainly doctrinal issues that
have generated much case law, the article approaches the topic through a
transcript of a panel discussion of capital prosecutors and defense lawyers who
have retried penalty-phase-only cases (constructed from individual interviews).
These attorneys present a kaleidoscopic set of perspectives that are sometimes
consistent, but often in conflict. This reflects the unpredictability of proceedings
where such momentous decisions are made so long after the original incident. Yet
despite some contradictions, the discussion provides much valuable guidance for
lawyers and judges who become involved in penalty-phase-only retrials.
I. INTRODUCTION
Death sentences are frequently reversed.' Sometimes this is due to an error in
the guilt/innocence phase that would necessitate a complete retrial; sometimes the
error is in the penalty phase that would necessitate retrial of sentencing only.
* This is a take-off on the well-known advice, "Don't switch horses in mid-stream." See A
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS 311 (Wolfgang Mieder et al. eds., 1992) (setting forth seven
variations of the proverbial advice against switching/changing/swapping horses in the middle of a
stream; the one asserted rationale is that the switcher's pants will get wet).
** Professor of Law, Drake Law School. The author extends his sincere thanks to his diligent
research assistants Brooke Burrage and Jason Dunn.
I The most intensive study of reversals, which attempted to consider every reported capital
case during the period 1973 to 1995, concluded that 68% of death sentences were reversed because of
error (although some were re-imposed after retrials). See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie
West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (June 12, 2000), at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman. Detractors of this study believe the
effective reversal rate was closer to 52%. See Barry Latzer & James N. G. Cauthen, Another
Recount: Appeals in Capital Cases, 35 THE PROSECUTOR 25, 25 (2001) (taking the Liebman study as
a baseline and recalculating using different premises). Either way, a large number of capital
sentences were reversed on appeal during that period, and there is little reason to believe the situation
has changed since 1995.
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When a capital conviction is affirmed and the sentence reversed, the prosecution
must decide whether to seek a death sentence again. Prosecutors regularly choose
to do so, resulting in penalty phases that are tried many years after the crime was
committed to juries that did not hear the guilt/innocence phase evidence.
Accordingly, strategies for belatedly retrying penalty phases to brand-new juries,
and the effects on capital jurors of these long-delayed proceedings, are of great
practical importance.
The academic literature, however, is virtually devoid of writing on this topic.
2
Presumably this is because penalty phase retrials raise few interesting doctrinal
issues. A potentially interesting constitutional issue-whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars a penalty phase retrial-turns out to be uninteresting because
the answer is a clear-cut "No."3 Issues of evidentiary admissibility, in general, are
also cut-and-dried: while states have different rules of admissibility at the penalty
phase,4 in all states the same rules that apply to original sentencings apply equally
2 All I have found are Margery B. Koosed, On Seeking Controlling Law and Re-seeking
Death Under Section 2929.06 of the Ohio Revised Code, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 261 (1998)
(examining the Ohio capital resentencing provision), and Janet Marie Walsh, Note, Coleman v.
McCormick, Due Process, and the Dilemma of Capital Resentencing, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (1990)
(discussing the due process ramifications of resentencing a capital defendant under a statute that has
been legislatively or judicially modified since the defendant's conviction).
3 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981), held that a prior finding of a non-death
sentence by a jury prohibits the prosecution from seeking the death penalty if the case is reversed
because the prior non-death sentence constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty. But there has
never been any prohibition against the prosecution's seeking the death penalty again where it was
imposed in the first instance, but reversed on appeal. The Supreme Court has referred to it as a
"common practice." See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 n.6 (1988) ("Finding a
constitutional right to rely on a guilt-phase jury's 'residual doubts' about innocence when the defense
presents its mitigating case in the penalty phase is arguably inconsistent with the common practice of
allowing penalty-only trials on remand of cases where a death sentence--but not the underlying
conviction-is struck down on appeal.") And as Professor George Thomas, the nation's leading
expert on double jeopardy, see GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW
(1998), wrote to me:
I can't imagine a plausible Double Jeopardy argument against being re-sentenced to death
after a death sentence was reversed unless, of course, the appellate court found the
evidence insufficient for any rational trier of fact to impose the death sentence. I'm not
sure what that would mean in the death context or if it is even possible, but assuming it is
a conceivable basis for reversal, the defendant could argue Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1 [1977]. There a unanimous Court held that a reversal of a conviction on those
grounds barred a new trial [of guilt/innocence]. In the absence of that probably really
unusual basis for reversal, there is no ground I can imagine for a Double Jeopardy bar to
resentencing to death after an earlier death verdict.
E-mail from George C. Thomas III, Professor of Law, Rutgers-Newark Center for Law and Justice
(Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with author).
4 There are two basic variations concerning what the prosecution is permitted to offer in
aggravation at the penalty phase. In some states, the prosecution may only present evidence relating
to statutory aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 803 A.2d 1, 32 (N.J. 2002) ("In a
capital sentencing trial, admissible evidence includes that evidence relating to the aggravating and
mitigating factors at issue."); Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1996) ("We have held
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to resentencings,5 supplemented by the common sense principle that the parties
must be permitted to introduce evidence from the guilt phase to familiarize the jury
with the case.6 As I will discuss later, however, there are two specific doctrinally
interesting admissibility issues: 1) to what extent may a defendant offer evidence
designed to undermine the new jury's confidence in the prior jury's verdict of
guilt; and 2) the same question with regard to the prior jury's finding of an
aggravating circumstance.
7
II. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
Aside from these two doctrinally intriguing issues, there is not much of
doctrinal interest about capital resentencings. Nonetheless, a practically important,
yet doctrinally less interesting topic, may simply call for a different kind of
research. So, rather than going to books, I went to the lawyers who have litigated
such proceedings. It turned out that they had very insightful things to say about
this topic, as well as some great "war stories." Thus, the remainder of this Article
consists of carefully organized and edited transcripts of my discussions about
penalty-phase-only litigation with fourteen experienced capital lawyers-six
prosecutors and eight defense counsel8-who have dealt with penalty-phase only
retrials. (While I sought lawyers with this particular experience, and questioned
them mainly about penalty-phase-only issues, many of their insights apply equally
to retrials of both phases of a case.)
Here are brief biographical sketches of the lawyers I interviewed:
that, to be admissible in the penalty phase, the State's direct evidence must relate to any of the
aggravating circumstances."). In other states, the prosecution may offer any evidence thought to be
aggravating; that is, the prosecution is not limited to presenting evidence that relates to legislatively
specified aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 739 (Mo. 2003)
("In considering capital punishment, the jury is entitled to a wide range of helpful information
[citations omitted]. 'The decision to impose the death penalty ... is the most serious decision society
makes about an individual, and the decision-maker is entitled to any evidence that assists in that
determination.' State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993)"); State v. Carroll, 573 S.E.2d
899, 913 (N.C. 2002) ("[T]he trial court has discretion to admit any evidence relevant to sentencing
[citations omitted]. Accordingly, the State is allowed to admit any evidence that substantially
supports the death penalty.").
5 This is rarely explicitly stated by appellate courts, but is clearly the practice followed in
every jurisdiction in which I talked with capital lawyers.
6 For a rare statement of this principle, see Hitchcock v. State, 673 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla.
1996) ("Evidence necessary to familiarize the [new penalty phase] jury with the underlying facts of
the case may also be introduced during the penalty phase.").
7 See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
8 I tried to interview eight prosecutors also, but came to a point where none of the
prosecutors I contacted called me back.
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Prosecutors
Mike Benito: Mr. Benito was a prosecutor in Hillsborough County, Florida
(Tampa) from 1978 to 1991. He tried more than twenty death penalty cases,
including two penalty-phase-only retrials. He is now in private practice in the
Tampa area.
9
Bill Hawkins: Mr. Hawkins has been a prosecutor in the Harris County, Texas
(Houston) District Attorney's Office for over twenty years. He has argued for the
death penalty in thirteen cases. I interviewed him a week after he had finished his
first penalty-phase-only retrial.' 0
Abe Laeser: Mr. Laeser has been a prosecutor in Dade County, Florida (Miami)
for over thirty years. He has handled a large number of death penalty cases,
including half a dozen penalty-phase-only retrials."
Lyn McClellan: Mr. McClellan is one of three Bureau Chiefs in the Harris
County, Texas (Houston) District Attorney's Office, where he has worked for
many years. This position puts him only one step below the District Attorney in
the office chain of command. From that perspective, he is familiar with many
penalty-phase-only retrials handled by his subordinates. 2
Chuck Morton: Mr. Morton has been an attorney in the Homicide Trial Unit of
the Broward County, Florida (Ft. Lauderdale) prosecutor's office for eighteen
years. He has lost count of the number of capital cases he has litigated. He has
tried about five penalty-phase-only retrials.13
Shirley Williams: Ms. Williams was a prosecutor in Hillsborough County, Florida
(Tampa) for fifteen years, until 2002. She litigated over twenty capital cases,
including two penalty-phase-only retrials. She is now in private practice in the
Tampa area. 14
9 Telephone Interview with Mike Benito, Former Prosecutor, Hillsborough County, Fla., in
Tampa, Fla. (Oct. 23, 2003).
10 Telephone Interview with Bill Hawkins, Prosecutor, Harris County, Tex., in Houston, Tex.
(Nov. 19, 2003).
11 Telephone Interview with Abe Laeser, Prosecutor, Dade County, Fla., in Miami, Fla. (Nov.
5, 2003).
12 Telephone Interview with Lyn McClellan, Bureau Chief, Harris County, Tex. Dist.
Attorney's Office, in Houston, Tex. (Nov. 13, 2003).
13 Telephone Interview with Chuck Morton, Attorney, Homicide Trial Unit, Broward County,
Fla., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (Oct. 15, 2003).
14 Telephone Interview with Shirley Williams, Former Prosecutor, Hillsborough County, Fla.,
in Tampa, Fla. (Oct. 2, 2003).
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Defense lawyers
John Britt: Mr. Britt has been a public defender in North Carolina for twenty-five
years, and has handled death penalty cases throughout that time. Four years ago he
became one of the two attorneys who started the special capital defender unit for
the Public Defenders service. He has litigated four penalty-phase-only retrials, two
of them for the same defendant after two sentence-only reversals. '
5
Jules Epstein: Mr. Epstein has been a criminal defense lawyer in Philadelphia for
twenty-five years, twelve as a public defender, and thirteen in private practice. He
has litigated more capital cases than he can count, and has tried two penalty-phase-
only cases. 16
Norris Gelman: Mr. Gelman has practiced criminal defense law in Philadelphia
for thirty-four years, and has handled death penalty cases throughout that time. He
has litigated three penalty-phase-only retrials.1
7
Johnny Kerns: Mr. Kerns has been a public defender in Alachua County, Florida
(Gainesville) for thirty-one years. He has handled numerous death penalty cases
over that period, including two penalty-phase-only retrials.'S
Sam Silver: Mr. Silver has practiced primarily civil litigation with a large
Philadelphia firm for fourteen years. But on a pro bono basis, he has retried two
penalty-phase-only retrials. 19
Neal Walker: Mr. Walker began his career as a public defender in Louisiana
twenty-four years ago, and has litigated numerous death penalty cases. He is
currently the Director of the Capital Appeals Project in Louisiana, but continues to
try death penalty cases. He has handled two penalty-phase-only cases, in both of
which he managed to negotiate life sentence pleas.20
15 Telephone Interview with John Britt, Public Defender, N.C. Capital Defender Unit, in
Durham, N.C. (Oct. 29, 2003).
16 Telephone Interview with Jules Epstein, Criminal Defense Attorney, in Philadelphia, Pa.
(Sept. 18, 2003).
17 Telephone Interview with Norris Gelman, Criminal Defense Attorney, in Philadelphia, Pa.
(Sept. 18, 2003).
18 Telephone Interview with Johnny Kems, Public Defender, Alachua County, Fla., in
Gainesville, Fla. (Oct. 28, 2003).
19 Telephone Interview with Sam Silver, Attorney, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept. 19, 2003).
20 Telephone Interview with Neal Walker, Director, La. Capital Appeals Project, in La. (Sept.
24, 2003).
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Bob Wolfrum: Mr. Wolfrum is a public defender in the Eastern District of
Missouri. He has been a defender for twenty-two years, and has handled many
death penalty cases. He has litigated one penalty-phase-only retrial. 21
John Wright: Mr. Wright has practiced criminal defense law in Huntsville, Texas,
for twenty-seven years. He has handled three penalty-phase-only retrials, two of
which were for the same defendant.22
The alert reader will have recognized that my interviewees do not hail from
across the country, but tend to be clustered in certain areas-four prosecutors from
Florida and two from Texas; three defense lawyers from Philadelphia, although the
remainder represent the five jurisdictions of Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, North
Carolina, and Texas. This pattern is the result of my method for finding persons to
interview: the only way I knew to find good lawyers who were familiar with
penalty-phase-only retrials was to start "asking around" in the death penalty
litigation community. This generated a pool of possible interviewees. I called
many of these people-and many did not return my calls or did not have
experience with such retrials-and I ended up interviewing the people who had
such experience and were willing to talk with me. The persons I interviewed
turned out to be a very talented and loquacious group of lawyers, but not
representative of a nationwide geographic spectrum. Nonetheless, their insights
tended to reinforce each other, which leads me to hypothesize that their experience
is more broadly generalizable than their geographic diversity might indicate. I
extend my heartfelt gratitude to these lawyers for the time they spent talking to me,
and the openness they exhibited.
The reader will also have noticed that none of these very experienced lawyers
has handled a large number of penalty-phase-only retrials. This fact indicates that
while there is a relatively large volume of these cases nationwide, they tend to be
distributed among a large number of lawyers. When I began my quest to interview
lawyers familiar with penalty-phase retrials, I suspected that I might find at least
one person who specialized in these cases, a lawyer who might be the "dean of
penalty-phase-only retrials." But after soliciting names from people who have a
wide perspective on death penalty litigation-including Stephen Bright of the
Southern Center for Human Rights, Roger Groot of the Capital Case
Clearinghouse at Washington and Lee, and Phil Wischkaemper, the Capital
Assistance Counsel of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyer's Project-I am
convinced that no such specialist exists.
The lawyers I interviewed reported handling a total of thirty-four penalty-
phase-only proceedings. Of these, twenty resulted in another death sentence, ten
21 Telephone Interview with Bob Wolfrum, Public Defender, E.D. Mo., in Mo. (Sept. 24,
2003).
22 Telephone Interview with John Wright, Criminal Defense Attorney, in Huntsville, Tex.
(Oct. 2, 2003).
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resulted in life verdicts, and four resulted in negotiated life sentence pleas. Given
that the death sentencing rate was one hundred percent in these cases in the earlier
penalty phase proceedings, it is obviously a major coup for a death-sentenced
defendant to get a sentence reversed, because it appears that the chance of a life
sentence on the second go-around is substantial.
III. THE INTERVIEWS
I interviewed these lawyers individually by telephone. But to usefully
organize the issues, I have taken the liberty of reconstructing the dialogues into a
roundtable discussion with myself as moderator. Also, while my conversations
with the lawyers involved the use of names of particular defendants, I have deleted
those names in the interests of privacy.
Moderator: Let us begin by exploring from the prosecutors' standpoint why a
death penalty might be sought--or not-when a case has been reversed as to
sentence only. Prosecutors, is there a presumption that if the case was deathworthy
once, it is still deathworthy after a sentence reversal?
Prosecutor Morton: Yes, one does start off with that presumption, but it certainly
depends on the facts, and on the state of present law, as well. Most resentencings
are older cases; there could be significant changes in the law which could change
our mind whether to seek the death penalty again. My analytical process is: first a
recognition that a sentence of death by jury means the death penalty presumptively
should be sought again; second, the availability of evidence-this is the most
determinative element of whether to proceed or not; and third, the present
aggravating and mitigating factors.
Prosecutor Laeser: There is obviously some presumption based on the fact the
case was deemed deserving of the death penalty in the first place. But there are a
lot of issues that I consider that do not necessarily deal with the crime in deciding
whether to go after the death penalty. For example, if the appellate court decided
that certain evidence should not have been admitted, we have to go to square one
and decide whether to go after the death penalty again. Also, other circumstances
change. For example, the guy who goes into prison at nineteen after committing a
mass murder who is now thirty-nine, has been in a few fights while
institutionalized, and as a result is brain-damaged; he is obviously a different
person now. In a case I tried in 1980, the defendant had shot eight people in a
robbery; three died and the other five were seriously injured. His I.Q. had declined
after being in a serious fight in prison. After a successful appeal, I would have to
ask myself whether the case still warranted the death penalty.
Prosecutor Hawkins: But you cannot take such defense claims at face value,
either. In one of my cases the defense told us that their client was going to die of
2004]
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diabetes. However, his medical records showed his glucose was good as mine-I
am a type 2 diabetic. Healthwise, he was doing fine.
Prosecutor McClellan: The imposition of an earlier death sentence does cause us
to lean toward seeking it again. If we got death before, we would have to look at
what has changed that would cause a jury not to give death again. We seriously
consider whether or not the facts of the case appear to be worthy of death and
whether a jury would consider them deathworthy. Twenty years ago crimes that
were deathworthy are not deathworthy today. We could get death for a lot of
things then that you cannot now. So obviously if the defendant had been given the
death penalty on something that is not currently statutorily allowed, we would not
seek the death penalty.
Prosecutor Williams: Here is an example of a case where, from an evidence
standpoint, it was viable to seek death penalty again. The defendant had shot one
victim who lived and one who died-the surviving victim was available to testify.
There was also a conviction on a prior murder, although the jury could not be
informed that he had received the death penalty for it. The sheriff at the time of
the murder was available to testify. The photographs were still preserved from the
previous trial. It was feasible to put all that information into the trial again.
Moderator: Defense lawyers, I assume that you try your best to convince
prosecutors not to pursue death sentences again. What techniques do you use?
Defense Attorney Walker: In both of my penalty-phase-only reversal cases, I
tried to keep the client away from a jury. In a case where there is a reasonable
certainty that a client will be convicted of capital murder and that you will be in
front a penalty phase jury, your overarching goal is to keep the client away from a
penalty phase jury and to settle the case somehow with a plea bargain or negotiated
settlement. With a reversal that requires retrial of both phases, you are basically
holding the same hand as prior to the original trial, and the same bargaining chips.
You can save the state time if your client is willing to plead guilty, and it limits the
state's risk that they might not be able to sustain a conviction. But with a penalty-
phase-only reversal, the state has the conviction, so you don't have a whole lot of
good cards to play. Nevertheless, in both of my cases we were able to negotiate
life sentences.
In one of the cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that there had been
ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase for failure to obtain mental
health records showing significant mental illness. This left me with a hand I could
work with on remand. I called the district attorney and said, "Look, we can retry
sentencing if you want. But read the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion. At some
point if he is re-sentenced to death we will be right back here with a post-
conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel with regards to the insanity
defense at the guilt/innocence phase. If you are willing not to oppose a life
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sentence we will agree not to file any post conviction motions to undertake to get
the conviction reversed." He agreed. I thought it was a good resolution for my
client, because he would never have had much of a chance with the insanity
defense even if it had been presented better. The number of insanity defenses that
have prevailed for the killing of a white by a black in the Deep South is limited.
The victim was a popular, well-known member of the business community. I
believe my client was psychotic when the offense occurred, but the offense itself
didn't bespeak a psychotic episode-it looked like a standard robbery/murder.
Realistically, he was never going to do any better than a life sentence. I love to try
cases, so for any non-capital case I am willing to rock and roll and trust my
instincts. But in a Deep South capital case, I am incredibly conservative.
In the other case, the prosecutor ultimately agreed to the same arrangement of
a life sentence in return for my client giving up post-conviction remedies. It was a
shock to me that the prosecutor was willing to agree, because the victim was a
police officer. I am sure the resolution came about, though, because there was
something about the prosecutor's behavior that the prosecutor did not want to
come out in public, which I am not going to get into here. Again, I thought it was
a great deal for my client, because the evidence against him was overwhelming
that he had shot a police officer during a burglary. But still, my client was not
thrilled. It was only because of his mother's urging that he agreed to be re-
sentenced to life. Even then, things still almost fell apart in open court. The judge
said at the beginning of the sentencing that he was going to ask my client what had
happened. I asked for a brief moment with my client. I was not sure what he
would do. I was on pins and needles. He only went through with it because his
mother was sitting in the first row. I went to see him in jail right after the court
proceeding. It was a real tiny parish where you had to go to the jail library to
interview prisoners. My client was sitting there crying like a baby. That was
about as low as I have ever felt, even though I knew it was the best possible
outcome. But I realized what I had taken away from him was hope.
Defense Attorney Britt: For a long time in North Carolina, it was a hard argument
to make against the prosecution pursuing a new penalty phase. Essentially, the
defense had to argue for a reduction of the charge to second-degree murder,
because under the statute, if there was evidence of aggravating factors, the
prosecution had no discretion to forgo capital punishment. The prosecution could
reduce the charges, but if they chose to proceed on first-degree murder, they had
no discretion not to pursue the death penalty. Fortunately, that law has recently
been changed, so now the prosecution can decide not to seek the death penalty
even in a first-degree case.23
23 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2004(a) (2003) (providing that a prosecutor may choose to
prosecute a first-degree murder as a non-capital case even if an aggravating circumstance exists, and
may accept a life sentence plea in a case that is being prosecuted capitally).
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Defense Attorney Kerns: It is not uncommon to work out some plea in avoidance
of the death penalty by giving up post-conviction rights.: But for me it is very
difficult to give up post-conviction rights. Anyway, I am not sure how effective
those waivers are for the prosecution. If the defendant breaches the agreement by
filing a post-conviction petition, isn't the state's remedy to declare the agreement
void and go back to retry the penalty phase? And is the state really going to want
to do that?
Defense Attorney Epstein: For one of my clients, the prosecutor offered that he
would get a life sentence in return for giving up all appeals. That was a great deal,
because my client had no good issues on appeal-his trial was so clean: he was
caught red-handed, he confessed, they had the gun, the ballistics-a child could
have tried the case for the prosecution. But I just could not bring my client to the
table-he just did not get that he had no appeal issues. So we went through the
penalty phase retrial. That was the worst week of my life, knowing that he had
given up a non-death resolution by giving up appeal rights of no value, and now
stood in danger of a death sentence. Fortunately, after two hours the jury a
returned a life sentence verdict.
Defense Attorney Silver: I had a very similar case. I argued to the prosecutor,
"You can't conceivably want to spend tax dollars on this." But she took a hard
line. Finally, on the eve of trial, she offered that the prosecution would accept a
penalty of life in prison if we waived all future challenges. But my client rejected
it despite my reservations. He said, "I have enough faith in you, Sam." I advised
him, "If we lose, you'll have no ineffective assistance of counsel argument for
appeal." I told him, "If we lose, you will be executed." It was a very difficult
situation for me to deal with. Fortunately, the jury returned a life verdict.
Defense Attorney Gelman: I was able to convince the prosecutor in one case not
to seek the death penalty by suggesting that I could make the trial last a month or
so-I had twenty peremptory challenges, for starters. Generally, a prosecutor is a
creature of image and publicity of the moment-a prosecutor does not want to be
stuck for four-to-five weeks on an old case. All the pizzazz is gone. The
prosecutor wants to be in the limelight, not bogged down by what happened years
ago. Plus, a case like that really only has a downside for a prosecutor: the case has
already been won once, so a loss will look pretty bad.
Moderator: I wonder whether the cases where death is sought again are the ones
that are highly aggravated, or include some relatively non-aggravated ones.
Prosecutors, can you give me some examples of the fact patterns of cases where
you have sought the death penalty again after a sentence-only reversal?
Prosecutor Benito: In one case an ex-boyfriend broke into his ex-girlfriend's
house and found her with her new boyfriend. He cut her head off with a machete
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and then jammed the machete into the boyfriend's face. The boyfriend managed to
go next door to the neighbor's house with a big hole in his face and get some
assistance. Miraculously he lived and was able to testify as to who the attacker
was. In another case the guy killed his wife and daughter in the garage with a
hammer then set the building on fire.
Prosecutor Hawkins: The penalty-phase-only case I just finished retrying last
week had the most horrible facts I have ever seen. The defendant had an extensive
record, including two aggravated robberies and the attempted murder of a police
officer. Then while he was on parole, during a six-week period, he committed four
aggravated robberies, and was indicted on five capital murders and was convicted
of one. Three of the aggravated robberies were of victims in hotel rooms, at
gunpoint. But all of the murders were in addition to those robberies. One murder
involved a badly decomposed body that had been stabbed to death during a
robbery. The defendant was tied to the scene by his bloody fingerprints above the
victim's body and in two places inside the victim's vehicle. The defendant also
tried to use the victim's credit card. Another murder was of a traveling salesman.
The guy sold T.V. Guides and had a route where he would check on the stock and
supply. The defendant confronted him at the back of his apartment complex and
started stabbing him in front of a small group of people. The victim fled and then
fell. The defendant came up behind him, stabbed him multiple times, and then fled
with the victim's Blazer and credit cards. Then another guy was sitting in a truck
outside of Wal-Mart waiting for his wife and daughter to come out. The defendant
walked up and asked him the time, produced a pistol, and had the man drive him to
a Houston ship channel. He had the guy get out of the truck and told him to take
off his boots. Then he shot the guy in the face with his .22, took out a knife, and
sliced the guy's abdomen from one side to another, and drove away in the truck.
Remarkably, the guy survived. Then we finally come to the murder that resulted in
the death sentence. A young couple had been married for three months. They had
moved to Houston from Louisiana because he got a job on an oil rig. The
defendant knocked on their motel room door and said he was with management.
When the husband opened the door, he shoved a gun in his face. He tied the
couple's hands and feet together on the bed, searched the room, discovered a .44
caliber pistol that belonged to the husband, gathered up other property and started
to leave. He came back, gagged them and then left again. He came back again,
put a sheet over the guy's head and when the guy woke up the next morning at
7:00 a.m. his wife was dead. The husband had been shot in the head with the .44.
He was shot in the temple and the bullet lodged in the base of the skull. It had to
be removed with surgery. We recovered the slug from the wall. Amazingly, the
husband recovered, and was available to testify at the new penalty phase.
When I started as a prosecutor, I was not a big believer in the death penalty. I
have come into contact with lots of cold individuals who have changed my mind. I
did not know about antisocial personality disorder then. I do now.
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Prosecutor Morton: One of mine was a particularly bad case. It was a
combination of a bad prior record and horrible circumstances. He was convicted
of kidnapping a young lady on New Year's Eve, raping her and burying her in a
construction site (her body was never found). He had a horrendous record.
Prosecutor Williams: In one of my penalty-phase-only retrials, the defendant was
living with a woman and renting an apartment from the victims-an elderly couple
in their seventies. He was behind on his rent and they served him with eviction
papers. He got an advance from his employer. He took the check to the victims,
signed it over, got a receipt, and with whatever money was left, he went out bar-
hopping, drinking and used up the remaining money on drugs. He then went back
to the victims' house to get the check back, but they would not give it to him. He
got a butcher knife from the kitchen. The woman was stabbed over thirty times,
and the man over fifty times. There was evidence he pursued them through their
own home. She had numerous defensive wounds on her arms and legs. The man
ran to the back of the house to get out and he also had numerous defensive
wounds. The couple rented the other part of their house to another couple who
heard them begging for help.
In my other case, the defendant went on a crime spree. He carjacked a vehicle
and killed the driver, drove it around for hours, then set it on fire. Then he was
hitchhiking and a girl and her boyfriend who were going home from the beach
picked him up. He shot her and left her for dead and then killed the boyfriend and
drove around for a while in their vehicle. He then attempted to rob a convenience
store and shot the clerk right between the eyes. The clerk actually survived. While
escaping from that robbery, he was caught. He was charged with two murders and
two attempted murders. This spree was not a one-night thing. It was over a week
or ten-day period.
Moderator: Well, almost anyone would agree that those are highly aggravated fact
patterns. Defense lawyers, have you found it to be true that prosecutors only select
highly aggravated cases to seek the death penalty again after a sentence-only
reversal?
Defense Attorney Britt: In one of my cases, my client and a buddy of his, both in
the Army, were into the Dungeons and Dragons game. It was a big deal going on
at the time; several people across the nation committed some bad acts inspired by
that game. These guys picked a woman at random on the street and followed her
home. Then they got all this martial arts gear, ninja costumes, head-to-toe dressed
in black-butterfly knives, blow guns. Their idea was they were ninja warriors
who would sneak into the castle and get booty of some kind. They entered the
home and brutally murdered the woman and her husband. They were captured two
hours later with all the stuff in the vehicle. They accidentally drove into a
restricted area. Military police saw them and pulled them over.
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Now admittedly, that was a bad case. But one of my other penalty-phase-only
retrials did not have horrendous facts. My client dabbled in drugs-nothing
heavy-marijuana here and there. He gave ten dollars worth of marijuana to a
friend of a friend; the guy was going to pay him later. My client mentioned it to
the guy, and the guy kept putting him off. One day, my client saw the guy pull up
next to the trailer where my client was living. My client picked up his sawed-off
shotgun, approached the guy's car, and basically said, "Where's my money?"
Then he shot the guy's head off. My client maintained that the gun went off
accidentally. But even if my client shot intentionally, the only really horrendous
thing about this case is how messy the killing was. The guy he shot was sitting in
the passenger seat. Part of the brain splattered on the driver; the whole inside of
the car was just a mess. The prosecution put on plenty of gruesome photos of it.
But my client in that case had a second-degree offer, which would have meant a
sentence of thirty-five to forty years, and he probably would have served less than
half that amount, but there was a change in the prosecutor. The new prosecutor
took the offer off the table. I think most people on Death Row in North Carolina at
one time had an offer they rejected or that was retracted by the prosecution.
My third penalty-phase-only case was not that terrible, either. My client was
separated from his wife. He was arrested for assault or some kind of confrontation
between them and was locked up over the weekend. On Monday evening after
getting out of jail, he was standing in the roadway outside her house. She drove
out to where he was in the road and he fired several shots and one killed her. The
prosecution contended he was waiting for her to come out so he could kill her. My
client's position was that he was not lying in wait, but that he only wanted to talk
to her. But I do not think the intent was the crucial issue for the death penalty.
Here is what was: the couple's two infants were in the car at the time. I am sure
the jury didn't appreciate that-shooting her and putting the kids at risk at the
same time.
Defense Attorney Epstein: Two of my penalty-phase-only retrials should not
have been death cases to begin with. In one of them, my client was involved in a
dispute with some guy who was sitting in a car. My client walked up and shot the
guy through the window with a shotgun. The prosecution's aggravating factor was
the grave risk to the other person sitting in the car. In my other case, my client
argued with a guy in a bar, left and returned in a car, and called the guy over to the
car and shot him. These are both run-of-the-mill murders-not deathworthy cases.
But for a long time Philadelphia had a district attorney who believed in alleging
death in almost every case where there was an aggravating factor, and letting juries
decide. There was a time when about eighty percent of homicide cases were
designated capital, although sometimes during negotiations before the trial, they
would back off the death penalty. But the Philadelphia D.A.'s Office has toned it
down in the last six months. I think they decided it was just beating the system to
a pulp resource-wise to have all these capital cases.
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I had a third case that was not a retrial, but raises the same issues because, due
to an odd set of circumstances, there was a different jury in the penalty phase at the
original trial. This case had worse facts that the other two. My client robbed one
person, robbed a second person and shot him when he resisted, and then went
around a comer and pistol-whipped a third man-a nice dentist who was staying in
the inner city to work out of a sense of obligation. The cops came and my client
pointed the gun at the cops and clicked, but the gun had jammed. My client
confessed to everything and could have had a life plea at any time, but would not
go for it.
Defense Attorney Walker: In one of my penalty-phase-only retrials, my client
was a parolee from Texas on a robbery conviction and transferred to Natchitoches
Parish. He started working for a lumber mill operator. One day he shot and killed
his employer. By the way, my client was black and the victim was white. Within
about ten minutes the body was discovered and the local police were called. On
the way to the scene, the police passed my client driving the victim's truck. My
client was apprehended by the police, interrogated, and he confessed in detail to
how the events took place and that he robbed his employer and stole his wallet and
his truck. Now this sounds plenty bad, but when the police asked why he shot his
employer my client responded that "an old man and an old woman told me to."
My client had a long history of mental illness, complete with hallucinations.
In my other penalty-phase-only case, it was clear why the prosecution was
intent on the death penalty-the victim was a cop. My client, who was a petty
thief, was burglarizing an insurance agency. A police officer saw a window sash
out of place and saw signs of forced entry. The officer went into the building and
when the smoke cleared, the officer was shot and killed with his own service
revolver.
Defense Attorney Gelman: The penalty-phase-only retrials I have handled have
not been really horrendous cases. They have involved a deliberate killing during a
robbery.
Defense Attorney Silver: Both of the penalty-phase-only retrials I have handled
were initially tried in the 1983-1984 period. Both had taken fifteen-to-twenty year
journeys through the courts before I retried them. Both involved death sentences
in situations where the jury originally found one aggravator and no mitigators.
One of them, on its face, had very bad facts. My client had a pretty awful-
looking rap sheet, and then was sentenced to death twice for killing two people in
separate incidents. In fact, he has been tried and convicted four separate times for
four different murders. This client is notorious in the prosecutor's office-they
consider him to be an evil man. He is not at the very top of their list, but is
certainly pretty high up there on the list of people they want executed.
My other penalty-phase-only retrial is an amazing case-it is an incredible
example of why the death penalty is so flawed. My client shot an individual in an
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abandoned drug house. The decedent was killed by a single bullet to the chest.
My client never disputed that he fired the shot, but from the day that my client met
his original defense attorney, he asserted that he shot the guy in self-defense
because he thought the guy was going to stab him. My client even provided names
of two witnesses who would testify that they saw the other guy come up to the
house with a knife in his hand. So the original defense attorney sent a letter to the
prosecutor stating in sum and substance, "My client gave me name of these two
witnesses. Please interview them and tell me if they have anything to say." This
was the letter the defense attorney sent to the prosecutor's office asking the
prosecutor to talk to these witnesses! The prosecutors replied that these witnesses
had nothing to say. This just should not have been a death penalty case! You
could put this to the Attorney General Ashcroft and he would say, "Nah, not a
death penalty case. 24
Moderator: These penalty-phase-only retrials must seem odd to the new jurors.
The judge instructs them that they have to abide by the guilty verdict, yet they have
not heard any of the evidence of guilt. Plus, it will soon come out when the date of
the offense is revealed that the case is years-sometimes decades old. What help
do jurors get in understanding the strange posture of the case?
Defense Attorney Britt: I always file a motion to preclude that a death sentence
was found at the first trial. That is always granted. But I think the jurors all
understand the case has been reversed and sent back, although that is not told to
them in any way-they figure it out. So in theory they do not know, but really
they do.
Defense Attorney Kerns: That is true. The jury is not supposed to know it is
coming back for resentencing. However, it is hard for them not to know. For
instance if the crime occurred in 1976 and the new jurors are sitting in 1998, they
must be asking themselves, "How come I haven't read about this is the paper?"
The jury is not fooled.
Prosecutor Laeser: I agree also. The jury has to be told in very gentle terms that
another jury has already heard the trial evidence. If the judge says, "I don't want
the jury to know he's been on Death Row for fifteen years," you have to fashion
your statements around that. But the dates have not been excised, so the jury
knows something is up. My assumption is that there are not twelve people stupid
enough not to figure out he has been sentenced to death before.
Defense Attorney Wright: If you have a guy who has earlier been sentenced to
death, it is virtually impossible to keep from the jury that he has been on Death
Row this whole time. The earlier death verdict is a major problem for the defense.
24 One assumes Mr. Silver is engaging in hyperbole here.
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If a jury has already found him deathworthy, that makes it easier for the new jury
to say that this guy should die, since twelve other jurors have already said this.
Defense Attorney Kerns: Under Florida procedure, even a seven-to-five vote for
death results in a death recommendation to the judge.2 5 So it is very important for
the defense to ascertain in voir dire how much the jury knows about the first
sentencing case. Specifically, do they know how the first jury found-that is, a
unanimous verdict, as opposed to a split verdict?
Prosecutor Morton: I agree that the new jury will figure out that the defendant
was previously sentenced to death. But in terms of what the new jury is likely to
know about the facts of the case, I think there is a distinction between populous
counties and smaller ones. If the case was tried years ago, in a populous county
like the one where I work, it is not likely to have jurors who remember the case.
So it is not that different than trying the case for the first time. But in smaller
counties, people will remember horrific crimes, publicity and all.
Moderator: Prosecutors, how do you try to get the jury up to speed on the
guilt/innocence facts? Obviously, you want to do more than simply present the
prior verdict form showing the conviction. But do you need to re-present all the
guilt/innocence phase evidence, to the extent it is still available?
Prosecutor Laeser: In Florida when a case is sent back for resentencing, both
parties start from square one, except for the fact of conviction. Indeed, the
prosecution can even prove additional aggravating circumstance(s) beyond what it
presented at the original trial. Under Florida law, we do not labor under the
hearsay rule at the penalty phase, so in a penalty-phase-only retrial, I can put on
summary witnesses. I can use a lead investigator to summarize parts or all of the
investigation-this is important because it limits the cross-examination the defense
can do. So I could put up a very bare bones case, but I do not do that.
Strategically, I put on as much evidence as possible. To convince a jury that a
death sentence is appropriate is a difficult task. I have to put on as many important
witnesses as possible. I have to pull emotional heartstrings. This takes a huge
amount of pretrial preparation. Usually it is a very old case; witnesses' memories
are not all that sharp. You do not like to refresh their recollection in front of a jury.
So it takes a lot of witness preparation.
25 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2003) (establishing that the jury renders an advisory
sentencing recommendation by majority vote, and the judge makes the findings of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and decides the sentence). But see Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 714
n.34 (Fla. 2002) (reiterating the longstanding Florida rule that the judge must accord great weight to
the advisory verdict, citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
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Prosecutor Benito: One significant difference in the voir dire in a penalty-phase-
only trial is that the jurors do not have to be made to understand the difference
between direct and circumstantial evidence.
Prosecutor Hawkins: In the case I just finished, at the original trial the
prosecution presented over a hundred witnesses. At our new penalty-phase, we
presented only forty witnesses. The prosecution still needs to put on a full case,
but we are able to dispense with a good deal of foundational evidence. For
example, we put in the beginning and end of the chain of custody for physical
evidence, like a cartridge case, but not the middle. Actually, that feels weird for a
trial attorney who is accustomed to laying a complete foundation.
Prosecutor Morton: With new juries, we are not limited to just aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. We put on as much guilt phase evidence as needed to
put the crime in its context. Juries want to be assured that the person they are
going to sentence did in fact commit the crime. Live witnesses are my preference.
Otherwise we have to use a detective to summarize the evidence, or transcripts of
the original trial will be read back. But that just does not have the same emotional
impact (often including tears) that you get from live witnesses.
Prosecutor McClellan: In Texas, if you have a resentencing on punishment phase
only, the state is going to put on evidence as if it was starting from the
guilt/innocence phase. Regardless of what phase is reversed we are going to
proceed the same as for a jury who had heard the entire case and was deciding the
punishment phase as well. All of these issues come out one way or the other either
in laying out the aggravating circumstances or when the mitigating factors are
presented. You have to present the facts of the crime itself and put on the same
evidence as you would in the guilt/innocence phase. The presentation of the
evidence does not differ very much at all. In one case the defendant had been on
Death Row for seventeen years before he got a retrial. We re-tried the whole
enchilada and were able to put on the same case we had previously. Of course,
sometimes you are forced to use transcripts of the previous trial, but that still helps
a lot in being able to substantially utilize your original strategy.
Prosecutor Benito: Certainly there are downsides to not being able to present all
the proof from the guilt/innocence phase because some of it has become
unavailable, but the upside is that the prosecutor can choose not to present
evidence that was not that strong in the first place, and instead present it in
summary form through a good detective. And hearsay is admissible in the new
penalty phase.
Moderator: I must now break the flow of this discussion to put my law professor
hat back on and discuss the law with respect to the two doctrinally interesting
issues in this area of the law: to what extent may a defendant attempt to challenge
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the guilty verdict; and to what extent challenge a prior finding of an aggravating
circumstance?
With respect to a defendant's attempting to undermine the prior guilty verdict,
the straightforward answer under the "law of the case" principle26 would seem to
be that a defendant is not permitted to do it, since the conviction was upheld on
appeal and is binding on the new jury. This is indeed the law in most
jurisdictions.27 There are at least two states, though, in which courts have held that
26 This doctrine is ubiquitous in both civil and criminal cases. See, e.g., Landowners v. City
of Fort Wayne, 622 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted):
In general, facts established at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on
which judgment was entered and appeal taken, are unalterably and finally established as
part of the law of the case and may not be relitigated at a subsequent stage. Even if the
judgment is erroneous, it nevertheless becomes the law of the case and thereafter binds
the parties unless successfully challenged on appeal. All issues decided directly or by
implication in a prior decision are binding in all further portions of the same case.
We note, however, that the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice.
This doctrine expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
previously decided. A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a
coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
Id. at 549.
Bickers v. State, No. E2002-02887-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 34509, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7,
2004) (citation omitted):
The "law of the case" refers to a doctrine which generally prohibits reconsideration of
issues that have already been decided in a prior appeal of the same case. Under the law
of the case doctrine, an appellate court's decision on an issue is binding in later trials and
appeals of the same case if the facts on the second trial or appeal are substantially the
same as the facts in the first trial or appeal.
Id. at *2.
27 See, e.g., Wilcher v. State, 863 So. 2d 776 (Miss. 2003):
It appears that Wilcher is under the impression that he had a right to relitigate his guilt of
the underlying capital murder in front of the jury during his resentencing. This Court has
held that the guilt of a capital murder is res judicata during the sentencing phase and may
not be relitigated .... During the guilt phase of Wilcher's trial, a jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating circumstances. The jury impaneled for
Wilcher's resentencing was charged with weighing those aggravating circumstances
against any mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 833.
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 917 (Fla. 2000) ("If Way had been able to put on the testimony of the
expert witness to explain the alternate theory of the crime ... he would have been [impermissibly]
relitigating the question of guilt rather than explaining the circumstances of the crime."); Holland v.
State, 705 So. 2d 307(Miss. 1997):
California, among other states, prohibits the introduction of this evidence. People v.
Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 656, 640 P.2d 776, 792 (1982) (stating "he
[defendant] had no right to attack 'the legality of the prior adjudication....' We found
'self-evident' the proposition that attempts to relitigate a prior finding of guilt are
prohibited."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822, 112 S. Ct. 83, 116 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1991); see
Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474, 477 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (approving statutory
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a defendant does have the right at resentencing to present evidence challenging the
guilty verdict2 8 (although if successful, the defendant would not have the verdict
overturned, but would avoid a death sentence). Also, as will be discussed shortly,
the permissibility of a defendant's challenging the guilty verdict is problematic
when that verdict is closely linked with aggravating circumstances that the
defendant is entitled to contest.
With respect to a defendant's attempting to undermine a prior finding of an
aggravating circumstance, the generally accepted and logically unimpeachable
principle is that a flawed penalty phase is a nullity.2 9 But how this principle plays
out in practice is dependent on how a state's capital punishment system is
structured. On one end of the spectrum are states like Georgia where first-degree
murder is defined without reference to capital punishment,3 ° with death eligibility
procedure allowing jury to consider aggravator "proved beyond a reasonable doubt" at
sentencing, if used at trial to reach conviction), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 886, 112 S. Ct.
242, 116 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1991); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130, 160
(1987) (stating "retrial of issues relevant only to guilt is not permitted."); Stockton v.
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196, 207 (1991) (holding defendant not
allowed to present evidence of innocence in penalty phase), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902,
112 S. Ct. 280, 116 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1991).
Id. at 323-24.
28 See, e.g., Romine v. State, 350 S.E.2d 446, 453 (Ga. 1986) (disapproving the prohibition of
defense attacks on the guilty verdict, particularly in a resentencing); State v. Stewart, 341 S.E.2d 789,
790 (S.C. 1986) (holding that since the State's evidence of guilt is admissible at the resentencing,
basic fairness requires that the defendant's evidence contesting guilt be admissible as well).
29 See, e.g., Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d 324, 334 (Fla. 2001) ("Where a defendant's death
sentence has been vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to conduct a new penalty phase
proceeding before a new jury, '[t]he resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the
proper sentence which the jury recommends be imposed. A prior sentence, vacated on appeal, is a
nullity,"' citing Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986)); State v. Copland, 300 S.E.2d
63, 75 (S.C. 1982) ("It is axiomatic, of course, that a death sentence infected by prejudicial trial error
is a nullity .... )
30 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1998):
Murder
(a) A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with
malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of
another human being.
(b) Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of
another human being which is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable
provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart.
(c) A person also commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of
a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of
malice.
(d) A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death
or by imprisonment for life.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
via aggravating circumstances completely determined in the penalty phase. 31 In
such states it is clear that the findings of aggravating circumstances from the
earlier null sentencing proceeding do not carry over to the new penalty phase, and
the defendant is entitled to present evidence to contest the aggravating
circumstances being argued by the prosecution. On the other end of the spectrum
are states like Texas whose statutes create a special crime of "capital murder,,
32
3" See id. at § 17-10-30 (Supp. 2003):
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances; death penalty:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony;
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary
or arson in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping,
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney
or solicitor-general, or former district attorney, solicitor, or solicitor-
general was committed during or because of the exercise of his or her
official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee, or firefighter while engaged in the performance of
his official duties;
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement; or
(10)The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement,
of himself or another.
32 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Supp. 2004), defining capital murder as murder
committed with at least one of the following additional circumstances present:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined under Section
19.02(b)(1) and:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful
discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer
or fireman;
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with the determination of death eligibility at the penalty phase hinging on "special
circumstances," primarily future dangerousness.33 Such statutes encompass the
"aggravating" factors within the very definition of capital murder. Thus, while the
findings of special circumstances at the flawed penalty phase are a nullity, the
findings of aggravating factors inherent in the guilty verdict should be entitled to
preclusive effect.
In the middle of the spectrum are states like Mississippi whose schemes
specially define a crime of "capital murder," 34 but then duplicate some of the
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated
sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under
Section 22.07(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6);
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape
from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another:
(A)who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or
(B)with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a
combination or in the profits of a combination;
(6) the person:
(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section
19.02, murders another; or
(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99
years for an offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03,
murders another;
(7) the person murders more than one person:
(A) during the same criminal transaction; or
(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are
committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct;
or
(8) the person murders an individual under six years of age.
33 See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(b) (Supp. 2004):
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(2) in cases in which the jury charge at the guilt or innocence stage permitted the jury to
find the defendant guilty as a party under Sections 7.01 and 7.02, Penal Code,
whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actually
cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another or
anticipated that a human life would be taken.
34 See Miss. CODEANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 2003):
"Murder" and "capital murder" defined
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elements of capital murder in aggravating circumstances.35  This raises a
doctrinally perplexing issue. For example, the following scenario arose in
(2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means
or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases:
(a) Murder which is perpetrated by killing a peace officer or
fireman while such officer or fireman is acting in his official
capacity or by reason of an act performed in his official
capacity, and with knowledge that the victim was a peace
officer or fireman. [definitions of "peace officer" omitted];
(b) Murder which is perpetrated by a person who is under
sentence of life imprisonment;
(c) Murder which is perpetrated by use or detonation of a bomb
or explosive device;
(d) Murder which is perpetrated by any person who has been
offered or has received anything of value for committing the
murder, and all parties to such a murder, are guilty as
principals;
(e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any
person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape,
burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery,
unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve
(12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind,
or in any attempt to commit such felonies;
(f) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any
person engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious
abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2)
of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to commit such felony;
(g) Murder which is perpetrated on educational property as
defined in Section 97-37-17;
(h) Murder which is perpetrated by the killing of any elected
official of a county, municipal, state or federal government
with knowledge that the victim was such public official.
15 See id. at § 99-19-101:
Jury determination of death penalty
(5) Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital offense was committed by a person under
sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence
to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
many persons.
(d) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was
engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
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Mississippi: the defendant was convicted at trial of capital murder on the basis of a
definition that included murder committed during the commission of rape, and the
jury also found at the penalty phase the aggravating circumstance of rape and
sentenced the defendant to death. An appellate court later affirmed the conviction
but overturned the death sentence. The prosecution elected to retry the penalty
phase, and the defendant sought to present evidence contesting that he committed
rape. A logical conundrum is apparent: the finding of rape in the capital murder
conviction should have preclusive effect, but at the same time the finding of rape
as an aggravating circumstance is a nullity, and thus apparently challengeable by
the defendant! The Mississippi Supreme Court, in a split decision, held that the
defendant could not challenge the finding that he had committed the rape
36
(although presumably he could have presented evidence that his role in the rape, as
an accomplice for example, had been less than fully culpable, because this would
have related to the "circumstances of the offense.") A similar example comes from
a Florida case, where a defendant whose convictions of murder and arson were
affirmed was held to have been properly barred from presenting evidence at the
resentencing showing he was not guilty of the arson, although he would have been
permitted to show a relevant mitigating circumstance such as that he had played a
relatively minor role in the arson compared to other accomplices.
37
To make matters more complex, the same analytical conundrum can arise
even in a state where the definition of first-degree murder is not duplicated in the
aggravating circumstances. For example, imagine that in Georgia a defendant is
convicted of two counts of murder at the original trial, and sentenced to death after
aircraft piracy, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any
child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual
unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious abuse
and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of
Section 97-5-39, Mississippi Code of 1972, or the unlawful
use or detonation of a bomb or explosive device.
(e) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape
from custody.
(f) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the
lawful exercise of any governmental function or the
enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel.
Comparing the Mississippi definition of capital murder, supra note 34, with the aggravating
circumstances, the substantial overlapping provisions of the murder definitions and the aggravating
circumstances are, respectively, 2(b) and 5(a), 2(c) and 5(c), 2(d) and 5(f), 2(e), (f) and 5(d), and 2(h)
and 5(g).
36 Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 324-27 (Miss. 1997). Compare the dissenting opinion in
which three judges joined, id. at 358-59 (Prather, J., dissenting).
37 See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 917 (Fla. 2000).
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the jury finds the aggravating circumstance of multiple murders.38 The convictions
are then affirmed on appeal, but the sentence reversed. The conundrum is again
apparent: in the new penalty phase, the two murder convictions would be entitled
to preclusive effect, 'but the finding of the aggravating circumstance of multiple
murders would be a nullity. So, should the defendant be permitted to introduce
evidence at the resentencing that he did not commit one of the murders? 39 The
same conundrum would arise if the defendant had been convicted in the earlier
proceeding of first-degree murder plus another felony arising out of the same
course of criminal conduct that provided the finding of an aggravating
circumstance ° -at a resentencing, is the defendant entitled to present evidence to
contest his commission of the other felony as an aggravating circumstance, even
though the guilty verdict of that felony is entitled to preclusive effect?
Yet another complexity is that the aggravating factor of prior serious felony
convictions of a defendant may be entitled to special treatment. The Supreme
Court has held in the non-capital context that the fact of a prior conviction is an
issue to which a defendant is not entitled to a jury determination a4 | and at least one
state supreme court has held that this principle carries over to capital sentencing. 42
If this is true, then probably a jury at a resentencing could be instructed that a prior
conviction aggravator found by an earlier jury is entitled to preclusive effect. Even
this wrinkle has another wrinkle, though, because if the prosecution goes beyond
trying to prove the fact that the defendant was convicted, and seeks to prove the
underlying details of the conviction, then one can be certain defendants would
often try to fight preclusive effect by contesting that the underlying facts are really
as damning as the prosecution claims.
To the extent a defendant at a resentencing attempts to present evidence to
undermine a guilty verdict, or an aggravating circumstance inherent in a guilty
verdict, the governing law from a constitutional standpoint is that relating to
"residual doubt," a.k.a. "lingering doubt" or, more pejoratively, "whimsical
doubt,''43 "Residual doubt" is a term to describe the phenomenon that a juror who
38 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(2), supra note 31.
39 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for authority that Georgia would permit the
defendant to attack the existence of the multiple murder aggravator.
40 See supra note 31.
41 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (exempting fact of prior conviction
from the requirement of a jury trial).
42 See Stallworth v. State, 868 So. 2d 1128 (Ala. 2001). See generally State v. Ring, 76 P.3d
421, 425 (Ariz. 2003) (analyzing in the aftermath of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the
preclusive effect of various aggravating circumstances in consolidated cases involving numerous
defendants whose death sentences were overturned because a judge rather than a jury had found
aggravating circumstances).
43 See Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 325 (Miss. 1997) ("Holland argues that our caselaw
requires the trial court to permit his presentation of evidence on whimsical or residual doubt. Our
caselaw has prohibited counsel from doing more than asserting whimsical doubt at closing
argument.").
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has found the defendant guilty beyond a doubt still may be unwilling to sentence
the defendant to death if there is the slightest doubt in the juror's mind about the
defendant's guilt.44 While the defendant is entitled to present penalty phase
evidence concerning "the circumstances of the offense, 45 and doubt about the
defendant's guilt is arguably relevant to the circumstances of the offense, the
Supreme Court long ago rejected this argument. In Franklin v. Lynaugh46 the
Court held that "residual doubt" does not relate to the "circumstances of the
offense," and thus a defendant has no constitutional right to a jury instruction that
the sentencer can consider residual doubt in determining the sentence.47  Most
states have followed the Court's lead on this issue, and refuse to permit the
defendant to introduce evidence at the penalty phase to suggest a doubt about the
defendant's guilt, or to require an instruction that the jury may consider residual
doubt in determining the sentence, although somewhat paradoxically, a fair
number of states do nonetheless permit defense counsel to argue residual doubt in
summation at the penalty phase, even though the defense is not entitled to present
any additional evidence to show lack of guilt, and is not entitled to a jury
instruction.48
44 See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1987-88) (defining "residual"
or "lingering doubt" as "(1) actual, reasonable doubt about guilt of any crime; (2) actual, reasonable
doubt that defendant was guilty of a capital offense, as opposed to other offenses; (3) a small degree
of doubt about (1) or (2), sufficient to cause the juror not to want to foreclose (by execution) the
possibility that new evidence might appear in the future."). For academic discussions of residual
doubt, all arguing that it should be accorded constitutional weight, see Margery Malkin Koosed,
Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the
Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41 (2001); Christina S. Pignatelli, Note, Residual
Doubt: It's a Life Saver, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 307 (2001); Jennifer R. Treadway, Note, "Residual Doubt"
in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It Is an Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
215 (1992).
45 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (reiterating that the triumvirate of
"character," "record," and "circumstances of the offense" are matters about which the defendant has a
constitutional right to present mitigating evidence); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 304 (1976) (establishing this triumvirate).
46 487 U.S. 164, 171 (1988).
41 Id. at 174:
Our edict that, in a capital case, "the sentencer . . . [may] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense," Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102
S. Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S., at 604, 98 S. Ct., at
2964), in no way mandates reconsideration by capital juries, in the sentencing phase, of
their "residual doubts" over a defendant's guilt. Such lingering doubts are not over any
aspect of petitioner's "character," "record," or a "circumstance of the offense." This
Court's prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional right to
have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor.
Id. at 174.
48 See Koosed, supra note 44, at 86-87 (footnote omitted):
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The concept of residual doubt is normally associated with an original trial
where the same jury determines both guilt and sentence. But for the sort of cases
that are the subject of this article-resentencings years later before a new jury that
is instructed that the guilt finding is binding-perhaps we should coin a new term,
like "belated residual doubt." Even this may be a misnomer, because how can
there be "residual" doubt when the new jury does not have any "residue" in its
memory? In this matter, as in so many others, capital defenders feel put upon.
Even though residual doubt has no constitutional status even at an original trial,
there are still ways a good lawyer may sub silencio seek to invoke its benefits. But
if there is no residue of doubt to draw upon, and no constitutional right to try to
create a residue of doubt, even good defense lawyers may founder. But there is a
practical consideration that cuts at least somewhat the other way: prosecutors
generally have an incentive to present guilt/innocence phase evidence at the
resentencing to familiarize the jurors with the case-and to energize their outrage
so as to induce a death verdict. And once the prosecutor presents evidence relating
to guilt, the defense may be able to undermine it by deft lawyering.
Now, getting back to our panel discussion, I am sure you all agree that the
issues of law of the case and residual doubt loom large with respect to
resentencings. From a practical standpoint, death penalty litigators know residual
doubt is a real and important phenomenon.49 The peculiar thing about the new jury
In the wake of frequent apparent misinterpretations of Franklin as holding that residual
doubts never matter, residual doubt seems to have become a largely unavailable
protection in the lower courts. Courts rarely reverse for failure to give the instruction,
perhaps leading some trial judges to be less forthcoming in giving them. The Illinois
Supreme Court and many other state courts sometimes approve of defense argument
about residual doubt but generally refuse to require jury instructions.
Id.
Professor Koosed argues that the "misinterpretation" of Franklin consists of first, failing to recognize
that the Court's pronouncement is arguably dictum; and second, failing to recognize that while a
majority of the Court may have held that no evidence of residual doubt about the defendant's identity
as the culprit relates to the circumstances of the offense, a majority also seems to have believed that
residual doubt evidence directed at the defendant's mental state or causal role does relate to the
circumstances of the offense. Id. at 76-77.
49 See William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in
Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476 (1998). In an ongoing project of interviewing capital jurors after
their service, the jurors were presented with a list of fifteen possible mitigating factors, including
residual doubt, and asked about their importance. The researchers summarized their findings as
follows:
By far, the strongest mitigating factor was lingering doubt, the one that read, "Although
the evidence was sufficient for a capital murder conviction, you had some lingering doubt
that (the defendant) was the actual killer. Some 13.4% of the jurors indicated that this
was a factor present in their case; of these, 62.9% said it was very important in their
punishment decision, 69.2% said it made them "less" likely, and 48.7% said "much less"
likely, to vote for death. In fact, of the 116 jurors who said that this was a factor in their
case, 69.5% cast their final vote for life in comparison to 41.7% of the 756 jurors who
said this was not a factor in their case. Lingering doubt outstrips its nearest rival, as a
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in a penalty-phase-only retrial is that they have no basis for having a residual
doubt, since they have not heard the guilt/innocence phase evidence. I am
guessing, though, that prosecutors still have to worry about the defense attempting
to inject doubt about the conviction, and any inherent aggravating circumstances.
Am I right about that?
Prosecutor Benito: The residual doubt phenomenon is very real. If one jury hears
both phases of a capital trial the jury wants to make sure that justice is handed out
and a guilty verdict is handed down. If it was a close case of guilt or innocence,
the jury is not going to then recommend the death penalty. They may have
lingering doubts about guilt or innocence and they can feel like they have served
justice by handing down a guilty verdict but helped the defense by not
recommending a death sentence. But that dynamic just does not exist for the new
jury. And if the defense tries to inject it, and the prosecutor objects, the judge may
reel the defense in and admonish the jury that they are not dealing with guilt or
innocence regarding this phase.
Prosecutor Laeser: Even though the jurors are told they have to assume guilt,
some jurors are very hesitant to accept someone else's finding. Some feel they
have to be absolutely certain of guilt before assessing a death sentence. As a
practical matter, we usually do present enough evidence to persuade them, but we
do not take anything for granted.
Prosecutor Hawkins: We are quick to shut the door on any residual doubt theory
with an objection. Plus, defense lawyers have to be wary of losing their
credibility. If they have a mountain of evidence coming against them showing the
defendant's guilt, they lose credibility if they nitpick the details. Also, if a jury
feels that a lawyer is wasting their time, the lawyer is going to lose credibility with
the jury.
Prosecutor Laeser: Actually, I love when defense lawyers try to cast doubt on the
defendant's guilt. I tell the jurors that the defense attorneys are asking them to
disregard the law the judge has given them. Trying to inject doubt is counter-
productive because it is extraordinarily difficult to argue that the defendant is not
guilty.
"very important" sentencing consideration, the "defendant had a history of mental
illness," by 18.6 percentage points; it outstrips its nearest rival that made jurors much less
likely to vote for death, "the defendant was mentally retarded," by 12.3 percentage
points. These data reveal that doubt about the defendant's guilt is both a fundamental and
abiding moral concern of jurors in deciding the appropriate punishment. The haunting
possibility of an erroneous capital murder conviction, and even more so, the prospect of
condemning and even executing an innocent person, is more formidable in jurors'
decision making than any of the other mitigating considerations.
Id. at 1534.
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Prosecutor Morton: The defense will particularly try to create residual doubt in
cases involving multiple defendants. They try to make the defendant seem less
accountable by attempting to shift the blame to the other accomplices. I generally
will not try to stop that unless it becomes out-of-hand or egregious. In fact, it lets
me focus the jury even more on facts that establish the defendant's guilt. Also, I
try to avoid appealable issues because our supreme court is very strict on how we
can argue aggravating circumstances.
Prosecutor Williams: Of course, the defense is not supposed to be able to make a
residual doubt argument-but they do. For example, they cross-examine witnesses
to point out weaknesses, bias-all the things they would try to do in the guilt stage
of the trial. It all depends on the judge how much of this is permitted. For
example, in one of my penalty-phase-only retrials, the judge permitted the defense
to make basically the same guilt/innocence argument it had lost at the original trial,
that is, the defendant's contention that a guy named Bobby (surname unknown) did
the crime while the defendant only watched. It was very difficult for the jury to
reconcile this argument with the instructions given that they were to accept the
guilty verdict as a given. I had to argue that the defendant had presented the same
theory to the first jury, and they had rejected it. Of course, the claim was really
weak to begin with. There were neither fingerprints on the knife nor any other
evidence of there being another person. The people next door said they only heard
one person and other people saw him walking in the area alone. Another key point
was that the case detective had gone down and interviewed the defendant right
after the crime, who said, "Bobby did it." The case detective said, "I don't believe
you," and the defendant finally admitted that he had committed the murders. The
jury at the retrial was convinced the defendant was making it up.
Anyway, the judge in that case-and I think most judges in these cases-bend
over backwards to be lenient in letting the defense make its case. The judges do
not want to commit error in the resentencing that will result in the case getting
reversed again.
Moderator: Defense lawyers, the prosecutors all believe that you try to inject
residual doubt. Are they right?
Defense Attorney Wolfrum: If there are problems with the state's proof at the
guilt phase, those are still worth pointing out to a jury in the penalty phase. Juries
sometimes want more than proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to give
someone the death penalty. If there is any doubt about guilt, the jury is not going
to sentence to death. I have seen instances where jurors said that the doubt was a
factor in their mind during the second stage proceeding.
Defense Attorney Britt: I have not tried to inject uncertainty about conviction. As
far as "whodunit," there was no question in any of the cases I have dealt with. I
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have found that if there is a significant question about who did it, the prosecution
will negotiate a plea bargain.
Defense Attorney Wright: I think defense lawyers should always thoroughly
investigate the state's case to try to find holes in the guilt/innocence phase and
attempt to introduce evidence of those at the penalty phase. The law says the jury
can look at the "circumstances of the offense., 50 The state sure harps on them. So
I contend that I can argue, "Oh, he's not even guilty of it"-although I recognize
that argument may not be available after Franklin v. Lynaugh.5' In one of my
penalty-phase-only retrials, we fought hard that my client did not commit the
burglary. It was a love triangle: my client goes to the apartment and finds his
girlfriend in bed with another guy so he pours gasoline on them and lights it up.
The man survived. If my client is to be believed, he says he lived with her and
says she let him in-so that would make it no longer capital offense because the
murder was not during the course of a burglary.
In my other penalty-phase-only case, there really was no doubt at all that my
client was the culprit. The crime was a horrible rape/murder, and we just told the
jury they were not going to hear much from us about the crime. He had been
found guilty, and we were not there to dispute that. Still, the State put on quite a
bit of evidence to show the offense. They went to a lot of trouble to make him
sound smarter and more horrible than he was by trying to emphasize the thought
processes that would be necessary to commit the crime.
Defense Attorney Gelman: You cannot challenge a finding of guilt, although you
can subtly try to inject some doubt. But it is usually better not to because the
prosecutor can really slam you on that. Plus, I do not think it is likely to be
effective to try to get this jury to say the first jury made a mistake-that is just not
going to happen. So you proceed with the assumption that they have been
convicted and try to show more mitigating circumstances than aggravating.
Defense Attorney Silver: I think trying the penalty phase to a new jury may give
the defense a slight advantage in contesting the aggravators, over the original trial.
It would be very hard to attack the aggravators right after you had just tried and
lost the guilt/innocence phase of a trial that included the aggravating evidence. If
you started trying to water down what they heard, I think the jury will resent you.
But before a new jury, it is possible for the defense to present evidence concerning
why the crime is not as bad as it seems. You are telling the jury, "I'm not asking
you to say he's not guilty, just that there is something about the crime that is not
that horrible." It is a difficult balancing act. In one of my retrials, the judge did
50 See supra note 45 and authorities cited therein.
5' 487 U.S. at 174. In light of the holding of Franklin, this assertion seems incorrect as a
matter of constitutional law, although perhaps a judge who is particularly reversal-averse might let a
defense lawyer get away with the argument.
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not follow the distinction between challenging the conviction and challenging the
aggravators, and got frustrated with us.
In a sense, the prosecutor's desire to present as much of the evidence as
possible from the original trial is not all bad for the defense-it can open some
possibilities for counterattack because the more prosecution evidence there is, the
more there is to possibly undermine. For example, in one of my retrials the
prosecutor's case attempted to bring in smidgeons of evidence from all four of my
client's murder convictions and how horrible they were. We challenged the
details. The prosecution brought in the rifle used to kill one of the victims-
literally held up for the jury-but my client had not shot the gun. On cross I asked,
"I'm sorry, did you say my client shot that?" and the witness had to answer that my
client had not. In fact, by putting on that evidence, the prosecutors enabled us to
expand upon a common theme, which was our client was the dumb guy who was
always dragged along as the extra stooge. He would do anything to be part of the
crowd. I will point out that this was a tactic the original defense lawyer could have
used. The difference is that we were better prepared. We obtained original trial
transcripts and examined them closely so that when evidence came up we were
prepared to ask questions like, "He didn't shoot the gun, did he?"
Defense Attorney Britt: I agree. Even if you are not contesting the conviction,
you should not just sit there and listen to the prosecution present their case. You
cross-examine and try to put your own slant on the facts. Perhaps there are some
facts that might weigh on mitigation. You want to emphasize those and de-
emphasize the aggravating aspects.
Defense Attorney Silver: But I will add that there is a way in which prosecutors
have a big advantage when the penalty trial is being handled by a defense attorney
who did not handle the original sentencing. The prosecutor's office has all the
files on the case. The new defense lawyer gets the files of the earlier defense
counsel. In one of my retrials, the prosecutor was able to ambush us with evidence
we did not know about.
Moderator: Another singular issue about these penalty-phase-only retrials is that
they always involve a crime that is many years old, because of the time involved in
the appellate process that resulted in the reversal. Prosecutors, do you find that it
is difficult to get jurors fired up enough to impose a death sentence in a case that is
years old, and where the passions of the moment may have cooled?
Prosecutor Hawkins: First, it is important to point out that this is an incredibly
emotional task we ask these jurors to do. Just last week I finished a penalty phase
retrial where the facts were some of the most horrendous I have ever dealt with,
both in terms of the defendant's crimes and his record-he was a "poster boy" for
the death penalty. The jury did vote unanimously for death, but the foreman was
so distraught he could barely pronounce the verdict. I think every juror was in
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tears. I always try to talk with jurors in death cases after they have reached their
verdict, but often it just is not possible without intruding too much when they are
in an emotional state.
Prosecutor Benito: I do think death penalty cases catch jurors off-guard. Here
you have twelve people who likely thought they were going to be in a trial for
drunk driving, car theft, or domestic abuse. Then you sit them down and tell them
they have to consider whether this man should live or die. They sit up and take
notice! I do not think it matters whether the crime occurred ten years ago. When
they are thrust in the middle of deciding whether someone should live or die, it all
becomes very immediate to them.
Prosecutor Laeser: I agree that the time lapse does not make much difference.
My death penalty cases do not come to trial the first time for three to five years.
That is because, first, most of these defendants do not want a trial at all, let alone a
speedy one; and second, Florida law allows full criminal deposition rights in all
cases. Sometimes a case like this will have well over a hundred witnesses. It is
hard to get everyone together to do even one deposition, especially if there are
multiple defendants. So it takes years to get all the pre-trial preparation done. So
even in original penalty phase proceedings, several years will have elapsed since
the crime.
Prosecutor Morton: I disagree that the time lapse is mostly insignificant for the
prosecution. I think the time lapse is a large factor in the defense's favor. Since
the crime is not current, the community does not feel as affected by it. My county
is urban and fast-growing, so a crime that may have affected psyche of community
ten or fifteen years ago will not have the same effect today. Sometimes the
prosecution has to present the evidence at the penalty phase in summary fashion,
and that just does not have same impact on juries. And on the defense side, they
can add new mitigating circumstances. They usually put on by live witnesses, and
juries can relate to people rather than cold transcripts. The bottom line is, of the
several cases where I have sought the death penalty again, combined with a half-
dozen cases of my colleagues of the same kind, I can only think of one where the
jury for the second time recommended the death penalty.
Prosecutor Williams: I have not noticed that reluctance by jurors, but perhaps that
is because all the penalty-phase-only cases I have done have been multiple
murders. When the defendant has killed more than one person, I think the jurors
tend to be more secure in imposing the death penalty. They do not think, "Hey,
I'm putting someone in the electric chair who maybe shouldn't be there." Instead,
they think, "Hey, he's got other murders, he's a really bad guy .... "
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Moderator: Regarding the evidence available to the prosecution, are there usually
still victim impact witnesses 52 available?
Prosecutor McClellan: Victim impact evidence is almost always still available.
Sometimes we put on such evidence, but personally, I am not a big believer in it. I
think it has zero affect on a jury's decision. Certain things are going to be obvious
to a jury. If a mother with small children is killed, then obviously a jury is going
to recognize the impact that will have on her family. It would not bother me at all
if it were never allowable to put into evidence a victim impact statement. Victim
impact statements are pretty limited as to what they can include, anyway. The
trauma of any murder is very obvious to any jury.
Prosecutor Laeser: I do not believe in victim impact evidence, either. If I present
it at all, it will be in front of a judge, and I usually just read a statement they have
given. I do not think it should matter if you have fifteen family members who
have clout or fifteen who do not. It just is not right that somebody who has a
wealthy or large or respected family and somebody else has a family that is
unwilling to come to court, or not as wealthy, or whatever. I realize that to many
people it seems imbalanced that the defense can present all this heartrending
evidence for the defendant and the prosecution really cannot. But victim impact
evidence is not fair, so as a matter of personal policy I do not use it. And by the
way, remember there is always another set of victims: the truth is for most of my
cases, the killer also "killed" his own family. Really deep down, the family hoped
this was the nephew who would make it okay, and then found out he has gone out
and become a serial killer or something.
Prosecutor Hawkins: For me, it is a strategic call whether victim impact
testimony will really help. For example, in the case I just finished, we did not use
any victim impact statement evidence. It was already 7:30 p.m. and my cross of
the defendant's psychologist painted an ugly picture of the defendant. I did not
think we needed victim impact evidence at that point. Plus, we already had put in
a form of victim impact evidence from the crime itself: the victim's husband, who
had also been shot and left for dead by the defendant survived, and testified about
the event. Obviously, his testimony was very powerful-he could barely keep it
together on the stand, even though it was years later and he was remarried.
Prosecutor Williams: I take a middle-of-the-road position on victim impact
evidence. I do not believe it makes a lot of difference to the jury, but it is good for
the victims' families to have that input. And if you have a defense strategy that
puts on a lot of evidence about the defendant's bad childhood, remorse, that kind
of stuff-victim impact evidence balances it out a bit.
52 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (permitting the prosecution to present
victim impact evidence without violating the Eighth Amendment).
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Moderator: Defense lawyers, what about the "heartrending" evidence of the
defendant's bad life that often is presented at the penalty phase. Is that harder or
easier to come by and present years later? And does it seem to be effective?
Defense Attorney Britt: For one of my penalty-phase-only clients we presented
mitigation evidence of his horrible life story. He was raised in the midst of terrible
abuse. He witnessed his mother being abused and was raised in that atmosphere of
fear. The father was a crazy, mean drunk. He would beat on the mom and fire
guns throughout the house. To me it was very compelling. But the jury returned a
death sentence anyway. Our investigator talked to some of the jurors afterwards
and they said that they didn't believe the family situation was as bad as we
portrayed it. They figured that if it had been that bad, someone would have
stepped in and stopped it! And this was before social services, or at least before
they were as active as they are now. This was a rural county-what went on in the
home stayed in the home. For those jurors to have the reaction they did, I just
could not believe it. I was just stunned that they could think that!
My other penalty-phase-only client, the guy who was influenced by Dungeons
and Dragons, also had one of the most horrendous histories. His mother was
schizophrenic, or at least seriously mentally ill. She was a horrible mother;
exposed her children to her engaging in sex, they witnessed knifings, and they
witnessed one homicide, I believe. She taught my client and his brother to steal.
They hardly ever went to school, and she was constantly running and hiding. She
raised these boys in the most horrible fashion, with whatever man she could hook
up with. At times, they lived in cars. The boys had quite a social services history.
I even called the dad to testify. He was stable, and had remarried. He had gone
through a nightmare of a process with the courts to get custody of the boys and
could not. But all that fell on deaf ears with the jury. They returned a death
sentence anyway. I suppose they just could not get past the horribleness of the
crime.
Defense Attorney Wright: In one of my cases we proved horrible child abuse and
mental retardation. The two play off of each other. Mental retardation can be
caused by a significant amount of abuse-my client had significant head injuries.
It shows up in medical tests and early diagnoses. Despite this, we have lost this
penalty phase each of the three times we had tried it. Once the jury has seen these
nice parents, nice pictures of the girl and then they bring on the autopsy/murder
pictures, we knew we were not going to win anything without a hearing procedure
where retardation was the sole issue-a hearing we asked for, but did not get. So
our prospects were bleak even though we put on about three times the quantity and
quality of evidence as we had before, especially in regards to experts. But the state
was also putting on a better case than they ever had; much greater detail about the
mental process that a person would go through to commit the crime-"If the guy
can think this well, he's not retarded." Still, there is no doubt in my mind, based
on twenty-five years of death penalty experience, that my client is retarded. But I
2004] 247
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
made a big mistake of putting him on the stand in 1990 for his competence trial.
What he said was used against him later in federal habeas and in the media, too. If
you were there and you heard him testify, you would understand his retardation,
but just by looking at what he said in black and white on paper he does not sound
retarded.
Defense Attorney Kerns: In one of my cases we established a dramatic mitigation
case on his behalf. He had a horrible, deplorable childhood. We assembled quite a
bit of information and convinced the state attorney not to go after the death penalty
on him and agree to a life sentence.
For one of my clients I was able to present some unusual mitigation: he had
received some notoriety as a writer while in on Death Row. We brought in writers
and editors to testify he had social value as a writer. In fact, in that case the
victim's closest relative actually testified for the defense in the retrial. My client
had killed this person's great aunt. The niece originally corresponded with my
client and then met him because she was trying to understand how someone could
do what he had done to a wonderful person like her aunt. She found him to be a
human being, and became interested in his writing-she was also a writer. A
relationship developed between the two. The niece testified how he helped and
assisted her. I have seen victims and defendants reconcile on a number of cases.
But the jury apparently did not receive any of that well-they returned a death
sentence.
For one of my clients, the most mitigating factor was his relatively old age. In
fact, his prison nickname was "Pops." He was in his mid-fifties for the first
homicide case, for which he got the death penalty. And while that case was getting
reversed for a new penalty phase, he was indicted on another murder charge. By
then he was in his mid-sixties and in pretty poor health. The lawyer who was
handling the second homicide and I managed to get life sentences on both cases
from the state.
Defense Attorney Epstein: The defense can also try to accentuate the positive.
For one of my clients the basic thrust of his mitigation was that he had helped a lot
of people in his family.
You cannot always show a horrible childhood. One of my clients came from
a lovely family and everybody but him was quite accomplished. But in jail, he
helped others; he even talked another inmate into going to drug rehabilitation.
Defense Attorney Walker: The context the jury comes from is very important.
For one of my clients, we could present evidence from the local welfare
department showing he was removed from home due to child neglect and had lived
a typical sort of childhood full of abuse and neglect. It is the type of poverty and
malnutrition that you see in most of these cases. But where his family lived, which
is also where the jurors lived, poverty is widespread. I do not know that the
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evidence would have had a great effect on that jury. Fortunately, we worked out a
deal so he did not have to face a jury verdict.
Defense Attorney Gelman: I want to point out that there is a rarely mentioned
downside to the rubric that the defense can present evidence regarding the
defendant's "character, record, and circumstances of the offense. 53 On the plus
side, this does permit evidence of rotten childhood and so forth. But the downside
is that before that formulation, a defense attorney had much greater latitude in
arguing to the jury. In essence, the parameters of argument have changed from
essay to short-answer. Formerly, a defense lawyer could refer to his own life
experiences. A lawyer could also ask the jurors to consider the larger policy
questions, like whether the death penalty is a deterrent, and whether it is
administered evenly. Also, a defense lawyer used to be able to say things like,
"Jesus loves my client; you kill him at your own peril." Today, a judge would
hold you in for contempt for that-there is a per se rule against quoting the Bible
in Pennsylvania in death penalty cases.54 Today, your whole argument and
approach are different. But a defense lawyer can still draw on Biblical themes. I
can still argue about the virtue of mercy and forgiveness, and how if a person
practices those principles that person might later get some for themselves. And I
still argue that it does not make sense to have in-kind punishment only for some
murder cases.
By the way, I think the "danger of death to more than one person" is a
relatively weak aggravator. In one of my cases, the murder victim and a female
passenger were in a car. My client put the gun past the woman in the car and shot
the victim, and then tried to shoot the woman. But she ended up only with a minor
wrist wound. In argument I asked the jury, "Are you going to kill my guy when
you have a living victim? You don't kill someone for an attempted murder." The
jury returned a life verdict. And of course, you always point out that your client is
not getting away with anything-he is still going to have to spend his life in
prison.
Defense Attorney Silver: For one of my clients, we were able to present proof that
his I.Q. was in the mid-fifties-well below the seventy that is considered as the
upper boundary of mentally retardation.55 I think he is a guy who is a paradigm
example of someone who was the product of a horrible environment, severely
lacking in mental capacities and doing whatever his brother and their crowd
53 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
54 See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991) ("We now admonish all
prosecutors that reliance in any manner on the Bible or any other religious writing in support of the
imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary
action."). Presumably, disciplinary action would equally lie against a defense attorney who made
such arguments against a death sentence.
55 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2003) ("Mild mental retardation is typically
used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70.").
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wanted him to do. Although we were only trying one sentence, the other cases
were brought in by the prosecution. We found he was not the ringleader, but
always the follower and in all instances, he did not inflict the mortal wound. It
matters when determining ultimate culpability. If I read his story in the paper
about this guy killing four people in four different situations, and I was on the
fence for the death penalty, I would think, "Gee, here's a case for the death
penalty." I thought there was a very strong possibility that he would be sentenced
to death again. I had always known the case as being a very horrible one. Upon
looking further, I realized it was winnable.
My theory of mitigation is to try every way possible, because you never know
what might work with one juror. We spent the money for an expensive PET scan,
and found visual evidence of organic brain dysfunction. We showed the jury that
he was mentally retarded, and I think it was very persuasive. I framed the first
question to the jury: "Are you prepared to execute someone who is mentally
retarded? Is that how you want to start the millennium?" We got a life verdict.
I also think it is very important at a resentencing for the jury to know your
client, and if possible, like your client. You need to put your client on the stand to
show remorse. I could not do that with my mentally-impaired client because there
would have been no way for me to control what he would say. But I put my other
client on the stand. The risk of that, though, is that your client is then on record as
saying he killed the victim, which might be detrimental in some later proceeding.
Moderator: Prosecutors, how do you attempt to counter this kind of defense
evidence?
Prosecutor Laeser: My experience is for the defense attorney in the penalty phase
to throw everything against the wall. Each juror the defense can pick off is to its
benefit, because in Florida, if they get six, they win. And even if they do not get
enough to avoid the death sentence, for the Florida Supreme Court I think it makes
a difference whether the vote was twelve-to-zero or eleven-to-one for the
prosecution, or only eight-to-four or seven-to-five. The appellate court may be
more inclined to find error if there were a significant number of jurors voting
against death.
My response to all the defense evidence about what a bad life the defendant
has had is to say to the jury, "Of course I feel bad that society has created a
monster, but should the bad background in the past disable us from imposing an
appropriate punishment now?" I had one death penalty case where the guy was
raised as a trained guerilla killer from childhood in Central America. He made it to
the U.S. and killed here. But does that mean society should not be able to impose
a fitting punishment?
Prosecutor Hawkins: I think mitigation has to really stand out for juries to take
note. I tried a mildly retarded man and that was not enough mitigation for that
jury.
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It can be great for the prosecution when the defendant testifies at the
resentencing. In the case I just finished, the defendant testified, even though the
defense lawyers did not want him to. I think he was trying to personalize himself.
But he minimized the crimes and did not even want to admit them. He claimed
that he "lost time" like the defendant in the movie "Primal Fear." He said he did
not remember the offenses at all. A prosecutor does not get many chances to
cross-examine a defendant in a death penalty case. It was a lot of fun. He was not
a good witness. Our psychologists diagnosed him as an anti-social personality.
We put the psychologist on after the defendant testified and that basically
destroyed anything the defendant said.
The defense presented testimony that he had a major cocaine problem and
was a dope fiend. They also presented evidence that his father never lived with his
mother. Both his brother and sister testified for him, but they also hurt him-his
sister is an associate pastor and his brother is a barber; they both turned out fine.
Actually, his background did not provide a lot of mitigation.
Moderator: Another aspect of the lapse of years is that the defendant will have
built up quite a record of behavior in prison---either good or bad. Does the defense
often offer evidence of good prison behavior,56 and do you think it is effective?
Prosecutor Williams: That is pretty standard defense strategy-get the prison
records-virtually all inmates have had some infractions after that length of time,
but usually they are pretty minor. But then, there is not much opportunity for
Death Row inmates to get into trouble; they are kept in individual cells and only let
out one hour a day.
Prosecutor Laeser: I agree. When the defense puts on testimony that he has been
a model prisoner, that is pretty easy to counter: if he is locked in a small room
twenty-three hours a day, there is not much of an opportunity to be a bad prisoner.
Prosecutor McClellan: One of my cases went back seventeen years. You have to
acknowledge to the jury in such a case that at the original trial the state was trying
a different person then than one who is sitting in the courtroom on the re-trial. The
person does not look or act the same or have the same demeanor. I think the big
issue is convincing the jury of the dangerous and continuing acts of violence that
the defendant is likely to commit. I do think jurors will examine the prior conduct
and behavior and will not put much stock in the fact that the person has been on
good behavior for the past seventeen years for the one hour a day he was allowed
out of his cell.
56 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant has a
constitutional right to present evidence of good behavior in prison as mitigation relating to the
defendant's character and record).
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Prosecutor Hawkins: Ironically, in the penalty-phase-only trial I just finished
where the defendant was a poster boy for the death penalty in terms of his prior
record and his numerous robberies and murders, the defense was able to present his
good prison record. The guy can do time.
Defense Attorney Silver: Perhaps prosecutors underestimate the power of a long,
good record of behavior in prison. We want jurors to think: "Why should I take
this person who has been serving a life sentence without causing problems, and say
now that we have to execute him? If the prison doesn't think he's a problem, why
should I?" It is really useful if the defense can get a prison employee to testify for
the defendant. In one of my penalty-phase-only retrials, we actually called the
warden of the prison to testify that my client had a perfectly clean record in his
seventeen years on Death Row, in addition to calling prison counselors. The jury
came back with a life sentence.
Defense Attorney Gelman: It certainly helps if the defense can call personnel
from the prison. For one of my clients, I subpoenaed two prison guards and paid
for their trip. They testified that my client was a great inmate and that he was one
of only two prisoners on Death Row who had a job. I then argued that my client
was doing all this when the government was trying to kill him. I told the jury,
"You not only need a reason to kill him, you need a compelling reason to kill him."
We got a life sentence.
Defense Attorney Britt: My client who had murdered in the Dungeons and
Dragons-inspired spree was a stellar inmate-he was taking college courses and
had a great disciplinary record. But he got another death sentence, anyway. In
hindsight, I worried and wondered whether we made it look too good-that the life
sentence he was serving was not all that uncomfortable for him.
Defense Attorney Wright: My mentally retarded client has not helped himself
with his prison record. He gets written up a lot for masturbating in front of the
female guards. He gets assault infractions, too. He does other stuff, too-he is a
pain to the prison officials because he just does not learn.
Defense Attorney Kerns: One of my clients had set a prison guard on fire. That
sure does not help.
Defense Attorney Epstein: Certainly a client can make things much harder at a
retrial due to their prison behavior. One of my penalty-phase-only clients
definitely made his situation worse with his behavior during his five years in jail;
there were detrimental disciplinary actions against him. That really knocked one
of the legs out from under our mitigation case, although we still managed to get a
life verdict.
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But for one of my other clients we presented evidence that he had been a good
inmate. He was black, as is most of Pennsylvania's prison population, and we
were able to get a white prison guard to come in and say that my client watched the
guards' backs and was a good inmate. We got a life verdict in that one, too.
Moderator: Another interesting aspect of the lapse of time from the crime to the
new penalty phase trial is that perhaps the state of the art of mitigation practice by
capital defense lawyers has improved. At least, some of my research leads me to
believe that it has. What do you think: have defense lawyers generally gotten
better at the mitigation phase than they were twenty, fifteen, or even ten years ago?
Prosecutor Laeser: There has been substantial improvement. A lot has to do with
the format set up in Florida. For instance, nowadays there is always a second chair
appointed on every death penalty case. That means one lawyer can focus on
mitigation. For example, defense lawyers now know about certain expert
witnesses. In almost all my death penalty cases now, the defense presents the same
expert witness who testifies about how it is proven that death-sentenced inmates
are not violent after getting on Death Row, and never commit a violent act again.
Prosecutor Benito: Most of our death penalty cases are handled by court
appointed lawyers or by the Public Defender's Office. They have a mitigation
specialist who deals with capital crimes. If there is a conflict they have a list of
attorneys who are pretty well qualified. They appoint two attorneys, one to handle
the first phase and the other to handle the second phase to handle the mitigation
component. It is too much a burden to have the same lawyer doing both. It helps
the public defender's office to have one lawyer arguing the guilt or innocence. If
the guy is convicted, the second attorney is a fresh face and can be believable when
he wants to present why the jury should not recommend the death penalty.
Prosecutor Hawkins: There is no question that defense counsel have gotten better
at mitigation. In Harris County there are a high number of investigative people
who only do mitigation. I think that in a lot of cases the defense realizes that
mitigation is all they have.
Prosecutor Morton: In my county, defense lawyers have definitely improved.
Now they all investigate mitigating evidence and employ experts, particularly
mental health experts. The Florida Bar now requires those handling death penalty
cases to have completed a certain number of CLE classes, or tried a significant
number of cases themselves or with someone else who has had extensive
experience. There is also a yearly seminar that the Florida Criminal Defense
Attorneys Association sponsors dealing exclusively with defending death penalty
cases.
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Prosecutor Williams: I am in private practice now, and my partner has just gone
to that seminar. They share motions and all sorts of things. He came back with a
notebook two inches thick. Originally, there was hardly any mitigating on behalf
of a defendant. Now, they go into it in depth. It can go for days and days-all
about learning disabilities, bad childhood, etc. They put more effort into
humanizing the defendant and to explaining why the defendant did the things he
did. And you do not want to object to it because if you do and the judge excludes
it, you might have yet another resentencing down the road.
Prosecutor McClellan: For a period of time here in Harris County defense
lawyers did not present much mitigation evidence. Nowadays, Harris County has a
lot of high caliber lawyers that are more prepared and have access to more
resources than previously.
Defense Attorney Wolfrum: Missouri has a good system within Capital Division
Districts. The State tries to ensure that every capital defendant is assigned an
experienced attorney. But I think experienced people make mistakes, even if you
do these cases all the time. The goal of the system is that people learn how to do
them and be better than someone who is handling traffic tickets. Competence
comes with experience and I do not know that everybody is better at it now than
ten years ago. I just do not think there are hard and fast rules you have to do every
case. I feel like the people I am working with have gotten individually better, and
have a sense of, "That works," or "That's a road that doesn't provide a return."
Defense Attorney Britt: Some defense lawyers have certainly improved. But I do
not think you can say that is true across-the-board. Some people work at it more.
Some have gotten much better at it. Generally, we have developed better
techniques and strategies. Here in North Carolina there are over thirty judicial
districts. In many areas, there are not public defenders. And the Capital Defenders
are relatively new; our office was started about four years ago with two of us here.
Within the last year, we have opened up three branch offices with a couple of
attorneys in each, and now there are three of us here. So in total, there are only
nine or ten of us specialized capital defense trial lawyers across the state. The vast
majority of death penalty defense is done by the private bar.
Defense Attorney Kerns: Back in 1970 when I started, we had no clue about
mitigation, believe me. We got more sophisticated and in response, the state got
more sophisticated. The whole mitigation in phase two has evolved for both sides.
The state now gets help from the Legislature. For example, in the late seventies
we began to use mental health mitigation. In Florida, recent legislation has been
passed to help the state counter mental health mitigation.5 7 If the state gives notice
57 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.202 (1999) (providing that a capital defendant who intends to
present the testimony of a mental health professional at the penalty phase must given written notice
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of seeking the death penalty, we have to tell them what mental health experts we
will be calling and what statutory and non-statutory mitigations the mental health
expert will be discussing. And if we put on medical experts, then we have to turn
our client over to a state expert.
Defense Attorney Epstein: We still have many lawyers who do not get it when it
comes to mitigation. A lot of lawyers treat the penalty phase as an afterthought or
delegate it out. But now in Philadelphia each death penalty defendant is assigned
two attorneys. There have been a lot of positive developments over the last several
years. There have been half a dozen mitigation trainings. The defense bar is
teaching lawyers what they can do, and lawyers are trying to do it better.
Defense Attorney Walker: I have to cast doubt on the rosy picture that is being
painted. Frankly, the state of capital defense in the Deep South is that defendants
are given a lick and promise when it comes to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
effective legal assistance. For example, right now I am looking at a file box in my
office that contains an eight-volume record of a fairly recent capital trial from
Shreveport. The defense attorney called one witness during both phases-the
client's sister. There is less than a page of the record devoted to mitigation.
This lack of effective representation has long been true. For example, in the
original trial of my client who killed the sawmill operator and told the police it was
because, "an old man and old woman told him to," there was a long history of
mental illness. To its credit, the defense in the original case did raise the issue of
the client's competence and sanity. However, the court-appointed psychiatrists
diagnosed him as a schizophrenic, but competent to stand trial-the competency
bar is very low in Louisiana, unless the defendant is a hothouse cabbage. At trial
the defense put on a barebones insanity defense, but the client was nevertheless
convicted. And then at the penalty phase, the only defense witness was the client's
mother.
I was appointed to handle the case on appeal. I learned that the client had
been on parole and under the care of a local mental health center provider. Any
reference or evidence that he was under psychiatric treatment would have been of
great importance to an insanity defense, but it was not presented at trial. I obtained
a release from the client and the local mental health center faxed back records.
There were six-to-eight months between when he was paroled in Texas and the
homicide in Louisiana. During that time he had voluntarily begun outpatient
mental health treatments. The doctor there had diagnosed the client psychotic and
delusional, and had endeavored to put him on a regime of anti-psychotic
medications. But the records showed that the doctor was unable to stabilize him
of that intent not less than twenty days before trial; that the notice must state the particular mental
mitigating circumstances the defendant hopes to prove through the expert; and that if the defendant is
convicted of capital murder, the court must then appoint an expert for the state to examine the
defendant with respect to the mental mitigating circumstances noticed by the defense).
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on an effective medication regime. As a consequence, his psychosis got more and
more out of control, and he stopped reporting to his parole officer. These
medications tend to remain in the system for a month or so, and then the patient is
predictably going to become psychotic. It was at that point the client became
psychotic and killed his employer. Of course, all this was of surpassing
importance, because the clinic records showed that the specific complaint/delusion
the client reported was of voices of an old man and woman who where telling him
to do bad things-which would have given meaning to the otherwise cryptic
confession where he had told the police that he had killed his employer "because
an old man and an old woman told me to!" These records had not been requested
by the defense lawyer at the original trial. The representation in this case was so
bad I think it was actually embarrassing for the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
reversed the penalty phase.
Defense Attorney Silver: Well certainly the cases I have handled show that
lawyers twenty years ago were not looking for mitigating factors at all. In one of
my cases, absolutely no mitigating evidence was presented at the original trial.
There was no mental health workup at all, despite the fact that the client obviously
had some problems with mental function. No defense witnesses were called at the
penalty phase. And that was not rare, frankly.
In one of my other cases the defendant's mother was called and examined for
what amounted to one page of testimony. Then the defense put on the client and
asked if he wanted to die, and he said he did not. The pathetic closing argument
was about how the lawyer had not been able to sleep at night while handling the
case. The lawyer really made it a personal appeal, "Don't put this on me that my
guy is going to get killed." The lawyer did not discuss his client-he only
discussed himself. That was it for mitigation. And this was as to my client who
shot the guy in the abandoned drug house, who actually had a viable claim of self-
defense! Only a completely horrible job of lawyering at original trial, and a
complete punting on the sentencing phase, could have resulted in the jury's
returning a guilty verdict and death sentence in just one hour. It is easy to see the
differences that lawyering made. It did not have to be me-but lawyering made a
huge difference. A man who should not have been executed was hours away. My
client was set to be executed during the first week of January 1995. We got the
case at Christmas and were able to get a stay on the eve of his execution. In fact,
he had been transported to the Death House. Now, he is in general population.
We are hoping for a chance to retry the guilt/innocence phase, and if we get that
opportunity, I think there is a good chance he will be completely acquitted.
In another case I worked on in Virginia that was an original sentencing, no
evidence was put on by either side in the penalty phase. The defendant's lawyer
basically said, "You know what you convicted him on, look in your heart." That
was one of the worst I have ever seen. But it is not unlike a lot of others I have
seen. I do not know what the thought process was back then.
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I think things are getting better in Pennsylvania now, in large part, because the
Federal Defender's Office has been involved in changing people's thought
processes by really doing a lot of training, at least for those defendants who get a
second shot at sentencing. But I do not know if that training has necessarily
filtered out to all the attorneys who are trying these cases tried in the first instance.
Defense Attorney Gelman: I do not think death penalty defense here in
Pennsylvania is generally getting better. Most lawyers shortchange the mitigation
phase. If they are court-appointed, they do not have the resources to do the job
right. In one of my penalty-phase-only cases, the defendant's family paid me, but
that is very unusual.
Moderator: Defense lawyers, I would like to talk about funding, both for attorneys
and other personnel, like investigators and experts. Is the funding sufficient?
Defense Attorney Wolfrum: The State Public Defender system here in Missouri
has funding for hiring of experts. I have not had the experience that I could not get
something that I really needed. Of course, state budgets are a problem. The Public
Defenders in Missouri took a budget hit when funding was decreased, and as a
result we lost some attorneys. But I have not been forced to go to trial in cases
where I felt like I need to hire a blood expert or a forensic psychologist and I could
not.
Defense Attorney Wright: Compensation used to be terrible, but now it is a lot
better! As of 2001, the Texas Legislature raised compensation levels, and
instituted a requirement of two defense lawyers in every capital case.
58
It used to be so unbalanced in favor of the prosecution. Back in 1990 in one
of my cases that got reversed for a new trial of both phases, I remember going to
the preliminary hearing. There were district attorneys from three counties at the
hearing working against me. During the hearing, they had set up a fax machine
down the hall. If they had a legal question, they would run down and fax it in and
a little while later, they would get an answer back. It was overwhelming. So I
contacted the Texas capital defense resource center, and they put me in contact
with a big firm in New York City59 that was willing to provide pro bono support
for me. That firm has now spent well over a million dollars on the case. That
evens things up a bit, but it is also just by luck.
Now with the Internet, it is much easier to find people for mitigation than it
used to be. For the last penalty phase retrial, we were able to find family,
neighbors, people who knew my client from his childhood and who remembered
his abuse and his retardation and could testify to it. On cross-examination, the
58 See TEX. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.052(e) (Supp. 2004) (directing the judge to appoint
two defense attorneys in a capital case).
59 A tip of the cap to Paul, Weiss, Rifiind, Wharton & Garrison, of New York City.
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prosecution accused us of manufacturing evidence. They were asking, "Why
didn't you make that case back in 1990?" Well, we did not have the resources then
that we do now.
Defense Attorney Silver: My big firm here in Philadelphia60 is one of those that is
committed to this work. It is the burden and responsibility of large firms to take on
these cases. My firm absorbs my time on these cases. The firm also pays for
extras, like a $10,000 PET scan that we needed for one of my clients.
Defense Attorney Epstein: In Pennsylvania, compensation varies from county to
county. In Philadelphia, a defense lawyer gets $2000 for all pretrial representation
and $400 a day during trial. Of course, this is a drop in the bucket of what a
defense really costs. I am in a small firm with three very supportive and tolerant
partners who think good death penalty representation is important. Basically, we
subsidize death penalty cases out of our better-paying cases.
Moderator: Mr. McClellan, since I have been lucky enough to get to talk to you as
a prosecutor who is high up in the chain of command in Harris County (Houston),
I am going to ask you a question that is off-point, but that will be of great interest
to people who are concerned about the death penalty. I am sure you realize that
Harris County is demonized by anti-death-penalty forces as the most bloodthirsty
county in the country, because of your high volume of death penalty prosecutions.
I wonder if you could comment about that perception?
Prosecutor McClellan: If you took just the population of Harris County it would
be the twenty-fifth largest state in the nation. Prior to 1999, about thirty-to-forty
percent of death-eligible cases in Harris County were prosecuted as death penalty
cases. Since 1999, it has been closer to ten percent, but that is still higher than
most other counties in Texas. That raises the question of why are the other
counties in Texas not seeking the death penalty as often? It is likely economic
reasons. Smaller counties have to make decisions based on their budgets. We do
not have to make those decisions based on economics in Harris County. That is
probably why we have more capital sentencings than any other county in the
nation.
We pride ourselves on having a very thorough and objective review process
for capital cases. There are twenty-two separate court divisions in Harris County.
For each division, we have three prosecutors, the most experienced of whom is
called the Chief of Court. Then there are three Bureau Chiefs, of which I am
one-my only superior is the District Attorney. Initially, when a case meets the
criteria for being a capital case, a Chief of Court will analyze the evidence. A
Chief prepares a Capital Murder Summary Report that includes all the aggravating
facts and circumstances as well as any known mitigating circumstances, and
60 Similar kudos to Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis LLP of Philadelphia.
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recommends whether to seek the death penalty. Then the District Attorney
examines the Report, solicits other opinions, including those of the Bureau Chiefs.
The District Attorney then makes the determination whether to seek the death
penalty.
Moderator: Well, I am going to conclude the discussion now. Thank you all very
much for participating. While we have covered a lot of ground that is difficult to
summarize, one overarching point does stand out to me: this discussion has
highlighted the fact that despite (or perhaps because of) thirty years of
constitutional regulation of capital punishment by the Supreme Court, death
penalty law and practice is still a remarkably patchwork affair. The cases that are
prosecuted as deathworthy, both originally and at resentencings, are usually-but
not always-the worst cases; some counties have the funds to have a coherent
policy of selecting deathworthy cases, and some do not; the quality of capital
defense lawyering has been and continues to be spotty, although perhaps
improving overall and particularly in large urban areas; some defendants luck-out
in the appeal process and end up being represented by high-powered law firms that
are willing to put over a million dollars of pro bono work into the defense, but
most defendants do not; some smaller-firm practitioners are willing to work at a
loss to do great work on death penalty cases, but many are not-and this list of
imbalances is far from complete. While there are ways to ameliorate some of these
imbalances, 61 the Court, and legislatures, have been in no to hurry
impose/implement them.
61 For my own suggestions for improvement of the capital punishment system, see David
McCord, An Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the Death Penalty
System, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 451 (2001).
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